This paper aims to offer an account of affective experiences within Predictive Processing, a novel framework that considers the brain to be a dynamical, hierarchical, Bayesian hypothesis-testing mechanism. We begin by outlining a set of common features of affective experiences that a PP-theory should aim to explain: feelings are conscious, they have valence, they motivate behaviour, and they are intentional states with particular and formal objects. We then review existing theories of affective experiences within Predictive Processing and delineate two families (...) of theories: Interoceptive Inference Theories and Error Dynamics Theories. We highlight the strengths and shortcomings of each family of theories and develop a synthesis: the Affective Inference Theory. Affective Inference Theory claims that valence corresponds to the expected rate of prediction error reduction. In turn, the particular object of a feeling is the object predicted to be the most likely cause of expected changes in prediction error rate, and the formal object of a feeling is a predictive model of the expected changes in prediction error rate caused by a given particular object. Finally, our theory shows how affective experiences bias action selection, directing the organism towards allostasis and towards optimal levels of uncertainty in order to minimise prediction error over time. (shrink)

Common ancestry is a central feature of the theory of evolution, yet it is not clear what “common ancestry” actually means; nor is it clear how it is related to other terms such as “the Tree of Life” and “the last universal common ancestor”. I argue these terms describe three distinct hypotheses ordered in a logical way: that there is a Tree of Life is a claim about the pattern of evolutionary history, that there is a last universal common ancestor (...) is an ontological claim about the existence of an entity of a specific kind, and that there is universal common ancestry is a claim about a causal pattern in the history of life. With these generalizations in mind, I argue that the existence of a Tree of Life entails a last universal common ancestor, which would entail universal common ancestry, but neither of the converse entailments hold. This allows us to make sense of the debates surrounding the Tree, as well as our lack of knowledge about the last universal common ancestor, while still maintaining the uncontroversial truth of universal common ancestry. (shrink)

Many phylogenetic systematists have criticized the Biological Species Concept (BSC) because it distorts evolutionary history. While defenses against this particular criticism have been attempted, I argue that these responses are unsuccessful. In addition, I argue that the source of this problem leads to previously unappreciated, and deeper, fatal objections. These objections to the BSC also straightforwardly apply to other species concepts that are not defined by genealogical history. What is missing from many previous discussions is the fact that the Tree (...) of Life, which represents phylogenetic history, is independent of our choice of species concept. Some species concepts are consistent with species having unique positions on the Tree while others, including the BSC, are not. Since representing history is of primary importance in evolutionary biology, these problems lead to the conclusion that the BSC, along with many other species concepts, are unacceptable. If species are to be taxa used in phylogenetic inferences, we need a history-based species concept. (shrink)

A natural starting place for developing a phylogenetic species concept is to examine monophyletic groups of organisms. Proponents of “the” Phylogenetic Species Concept fall into one of two camps. The first camp denies that species even could be monophyletic and groups organisms using character traits. The second groups organisms using common ancestry and requires that species must be monophyletic. I argue that neither view is entirely correct. While monophyletic groups of organisms exist, they should not be equated with species. Instead, (...) species must meet the more restrictive criterion of being genealogically exclusive groups where the members are more closely related to each other than to anything outside the group. I carefully spell out different versions of what this might mean and arrive at a working definition of exclusivity that forms groups that can function within phylogenetic theory. I conclude by arguing that while a phylogenetic species concept must use exclusivity as a grouping criterion, a variety of ranking criteria are consistent with the requirement that species can be placed on phylogenetic trees. (shrink)

El martes 26 de abril de 2016 en la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana de Medellín, en el curso “De la analítica a los acto de habla” del Doctorado en Filosofía, tuvimos la oportunidad de compartir y hacer una conversatorio con el filósofo mexicano Dr. Alejandro Tomasini Bassols, investigador del Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas y profesor de filosofía en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la UNAM. El profesor Tomasini es uno de los investigadores más reconocidos en la obra del Filósofo (...) austriaco Ludwig Wittgenstein, además de haber desarrollado una importante obra alrededor de la tradición analítica y de algunos problemas actuales como la discusión sobre la pena capital. También el profesor Tomasini en su visita a Colombia, inicialmente participó en Medellín con una conferencia titulada “Derecho y objetividad”, en la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana y luego en la Feria del Libro de Bogotá –FILBO- realizó la presentación y conferencia del libro Hacer mundos: el nombrar y la significatividad. Previo a su viaje a Bogotá, interactuó con el curso doctoral en filosofía y de este encuentro académico presentamos el siguiente diálogo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Theorizing the Language of LawJesús Rodríguez-Velasco (bio)Law transforms reality, de iure and de facto, inasmuch as it attempts to bridge the gap between that which is done de facto and that which is regulated de iure. It is standard practice, for Alfonso X of Castile,1 to reinvent the means of writing the law. He does not limit himself to compiling or revising existing legal statutes; rather, he elevates (...) the corpus of the law to the level of juridical science. Dominating the meaning of the word—its hermeneutics and its relation to truth, lies, rhetoric, history, and poetry—is also the key to dominating juridical discourse itself and its capacity for creating certainty. Or, at least, for controlling uncertainty. Uncertainty, that is to say, the ambiguity in the interpretation of the relationship between words and things, appears to be one of the targets of Alfonsine juridical science.It is in the institutions that one can best study this desire for control. In particular, the need for control becomes visible in the court and the places related to it (the palace, chamber, or bedroom), codified by the law in order to put justice into action, in the representation of power, in cultural exchange, in education, and in recreation. Here legislation acquires a special significance with respect to the word, to narration, and to rhetoric. This is a philological problem: How does one compose and administer a text capable of controlling its own interpretation? How does one transpose this same dynamic to the institutions? How does one transmit this notion from the institution to those who inhabit it and who are, after all, the subjects of the legal science?It is therefore fitting to examine legislation about legal discourse, which is, in itself, the theory of law—not, however, in its abstract aspects but rather in the concrete elements of the formation of a legal vocabulary, in the way in which words, whose semantic and hermeneutic problems are clear, give life to this legal vocabulary. How is legal discourse constructed? In what way is it transmitted? What are the consequences of its dissemination? In what way is the law in charge of words, in particular, those expressed in the institutions?Perhaps the problem is philological, in the sense supposed by Giambattista Vico. Vico, in his Principi per una scienza nuova [1: 10] proposed that the study of philosophy, as a science of truth could not exist independently without a philology, the origin of the conscience of certainty (coscienza del certo). Attaching myself, then, to this idea of certainty (although not, of course, from Vico’s perspective) throughout this study I shall call “the space of certainty” the theoretical and conceptual construction (which is of both a philological and textual character) stipulated by the legislator in an attempt to control the distinct concepts related to the legal word, its institutional statute and its legal, moral, and cultural hermeneutics. I shall thus attempt to understand the meaning of this space of certainty, in what way it has been constructed, and how it affects legal, political, social, and cultural mechanisms. [End Page 64]1Law and KingIn the first title of the first Partida, Alfonso outlines the virtues of the laws.2 In addition, this first law discusses the overall structure of the Siete partidas, as if, in fact, they were nothing more than a lengthy and virtuous discourse about the law. It makes sense as the Partidas are not only a legal code capable of being enforced but also an enormous manual on legal theory. The law(s) and legal doctrine, then, come together to form the first expression of legal science. Going further than compilations of Roman law such as the Liber augustalis,3 further than the scientific expressions of jurisprudence of specialists from Bologna, the Île-de-France, and Orleans utroque iure,4 the Partidas—and I should like to insist on this—can be considered a constitutional legal text. In this sense the Partidas attempts to regulate the actual material from which the laws are made: language. Put another way, the text of the Partidas is at once legality, establishment, and discussion of legal language... (shrink)

Phylogenetics is the study and reconstruction of evolutionary history and is filled with numerous foundational issues of interest to philosophers. This paper briefly introduces some central concepts in the field, describes some of the main methods for inferring phylogenies, and provides some arguments for the superiority of model-based methods such as Likelihood and Bayesian methods over nonparametric methods such as parsimony. It also raises some underdeveloped issues in the field of interest to philosophers.

The present paper explores the phenomenology of disorientation and its relationship with self-consciousness. Section 1 discusses previous literature on the links between self-location and self-consciousness and proposes a distinction between minimal self-location and integrated self-location. The double aim of the paper is to use this distinction to deepen our understanding of spatial disorientation, and to use the phenomenology of disorientation to elucidate the role that integrated self-location plays in shaping self-consciousness. Section 2 starts by looking at the experience of being (...) “turned around”, which is a common experience of disorientation. This analysis leads to the conclusion that integrated self-location is transmodal and depends on all three egocentric axes, and that disorientation destabilizes this integrated self-location. Section 3 explores a corpus of reports of disorientation episodes and highlights four key characteristics of these experiences and their links to self-consciousness, focusing on the transformations in both the lived body and the experience of space. The central thesis of this paper is that during disorientation a destabilization of integrated self-location results in a diminished form of self-consciousness. (shrink)

Bayesian methods have become among the most popular methods in phylogenetics, but theoretical opposition to this methodology remains. After providing an introduction to Bayesian theory in this context, I attempt to tackle the problem mentioned most often in the literature: the “problem of the priors”—how to assign prior probabilities to tree hypotheses. I first argue that a recent objection—that an appropriate assignment of priors is impossible—is based on a misunderstanding of what ignorance and bias are. I then consider different methods (...) of assigning prior probabilities to trees. I argue that priors need to be derived from an understanding of how distinct taxa have evolved and that the appropriate evolutionary model is captured by the Yule birth–death process. This process leads to a well-known statistical distribution over trees. Though further modifications may be necessary to model more complex aspects of the branching process, they must be modifications to parameters in an underlying Yule model. Ignoring these Yule priors commits a fallacy leading to mistaken inferences both about the trees themselves and about macroevolutionary processes more generally. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell dedicó parte de su obra a la discusión sobre el problema de la referencia y la descripción . Russell, junto Whitehead, elaboró un tratado de lógica matemática, titulado Principia Mathematica en el que retomó el proyecto de Frege tratando de demostrar que la matemática es una rama de la lógica. Russell no sólo tiene este propósito logicista, sino que también quiere concebir un lenguaje lógicamente perfecto , esto es, un lenguaje preciso, en el que se elimina toda ambigüedad (...) y vaguedad. En una palabra, el lenguaje de la ciencia en el que a todo nombre, por ejemplo, le “corresponde” un objeto. El Wittgenstein de las Investigaciones filosóficas se enfrentará a tal proyecto y a la concepción de un lenguaje cartográfico de la realidad. El autor, propone por el contrario, la reivindicación de un lenguaje sencillo, austero, cotidiano y plural, lejos de toda “estructura oculta”, finalmente, un lenguaje que no trasgreda las prácticas comunes y de paso a un lenguaje filosófico menos “enredado” y “dogmatico”. Pretendemos resaltar cómo la crítica a la búsqueda de un lenguaje perfecto permite que al lenguaje y a la filosofía misma, se les conciba de un modo más abierto, cotidiano y plural, en palabras del mismo Wittgenstein, una filosofía descansada “que ya no se fustigue más con preguntas que la ponen a ella misma en cuestión”. (shrink)

In this paper I address the question of whether the probabilities that appear in models of stochastic gene expression are objective or subjective. I argue that while our best models of the phenomena in question are stochastic models, this fact should not lead us to automatically assume that the processes are inherently stochastic. After distinguishing between models and reality, I give a brief introduction to the philosophical problem of the interpretation of probability statements. I argue that the objective vs. subjective (...) distinction is a false dichotomy and is an unhelpful distinction in this case. Instead, the probabilities in our models of gene expression exhibit standard features of both objectivity and subjectivity. (shrink)

Drosophila flies began to be used in the study of species evolution during the late 1930s. The geneticists Natasha Sivertzeva-Dobzhansky and Elizabeth Reed pioneered this work in the United States, and María Monclús conducted similar studies in Spain. The research they carried out with their husbands enabled Drosophila population genetics to take off and reveals a genealogy of women geneticists grounded in mutual inspiration. Their work also shows that women were present in population genetics from the beginning, although their contributions (...) have previously remained unacknowledged. The similarities between their research biographies also illustrate their position in a genealogy of partnerships working on Drosophila genetics. (shrink)

In March 2021, the Spanish Congress approved the law regulating euthanasia, that regulates both euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS). In this article, we analyse the Spanish law regulating euthanasia and PAS, comparing it with the rest of the European laws on euthanasia and PAS (Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg). Identified strengths of the Spanish law, with respect to other norms, are that it is a law with many safeguards, which broadly recognises professionals’ right to conscientious objection and the specification that it (...) makes on the prior comprehensive care of the patient, including the approach to care dependency. Regarding its shortcomings, the law does not differentiate well between euthanasia and PAS; it barely assigns a role to the healthcare team as a whole (similar to other regulations); it does not clarify the functions of the different professionals involved; it does not detail the specific composition and duration of theevaluation commission; it has not been accompanied by a prior or simultaneous regulation of palliative care; and, lastly, the period of time to implement the law is too short. (shrink)

La migración internacional nos enfrenta con problemas irresolubles desde la figura moderna del Estado nacional, su concepto de ciudadanía y su noción de justicia. Juan Carlos Velasco critica las limitaciones y la orientación de las políticas contemporáneas que nos hacen percibir a la migración como una “invasión”, y propone un modo radicalmente diferente de entender e intervenir el fenómeno desde lo trasnacional. Nacer de uno u otro lado de una línea divisoria es un evento azaroso, no obstante delimitar la (...) frontera es una construcción histórico-política: la desigualdad en las oportunidades que ofrecen las naciones es una situación estructural de injusticia que se perpetúa con las políticas de exclusión de los migrantes y la deslegitimación de su derecho a buscar una vida mejor. Esa circunstancia genera fracturas sociales, injustificables pero normalizadas, que imposibilitan alcanzar la justicia global. Velasco presenta un análisis completo que abarca las dimensiones política, jurídica y moral del tema, en el que lleva a la filosofía política a un terreno práctico del que se desprenden las claves para entender y actuar en esta nueva era en la que, debido a los conflictos sociales y políticos, la migración vuelve a ser argumento de discusión relevante. (Texto de la CONTRAPORTADA del libro). (shrink)

In the current context of widespread environmental collapse, ecological grief—the sense of loss that arises from experiencing environmental destruction—has become a burgeoning topic of inquiry across psychology, geography, and anthropology. The central challenge in the study of ecological grief is that its theoretical foundations remain underdeveloped. Recent discussions in philosophy of emotions elucidate that a central element in this theoretical challenge is determining what the object of ecological grief is. In turn, our understanding of the object of ecological grief goes (...) hand in hand with our understanding of the nature of ecological grief. This paper develops a phenomenological analysis of cross‐cultural subjective reports that identifies crucial themes in the experience of ecological grief. This phenomenological analysis reveals the object of ecological grief as the loss of the life possibilities that are sustained by dwelling. The resulting view is that ecological grief corresponds to a crisis in dwelling—a disturbance in the very way we inhabit our home environment. (shrink)

This paper introduces the hypothesis that boredom may be a decisive factor in the social outbreak that took place in Chile in 2019. It is based on another hypothesis that postulates that boredom can become a political emotion capable of unleashing a revolution when it affects an entire community. The main objective of the work is to explain the theoretical, philosophical framework in which the second hypothesis is inscribed and to give reasons why, if this is true, it could be (...) applied to the specific case of Chile. In this sense, an unpublished definition of the concept of boredom is first outlined and the literature that describes boredom as a reactive and political emotion is examined. Then, the Chilean socio-political context of the last forty years is analyzed in search of isolatable factors that may be related to the experience of boredom. Lastly, an original line of research is proposed on which to work to test both hypotheses in a broader project that aims to be able to predict when a social system is on the verge of collapse because of boredom. (shrink)

Esta obra está organizada en tres partes, en las que se indaga la plausibilidad del discurso de la Bioética y Teológica. En la primera de ellas, se estudia el vínculo que existe entre esta disciplina científica, el mensaje evangélico y la tradición cristiana, punto de partida y origen de todo este entramado bioético que aspira a sal-vaguardar valores humanos fundamentales. En la segunda, se trata de la relación que debe regir entre esta rama de la Teología y el polifacético mundo (...) científico (biomedicina, bioderecho, etc.). Por su parte, en la tercera, se analiza el estatuto epistemológico que configura a la Bioética Teológica, es decir, sus señas de identi-dad; asimismo, en esta sección, se indaga igualmente acerca del papel que, por derecho propio, corresponde en la vida pública a esta disciplina científica. (shrink)

Entre enero y febrero de 1970, el norteamericano Saul Kripke impartió tres importantes conferencias en la Universidad de Princeton que posteriormente se publicaron bajo el titulo de El nombrar y la necesidad. En dichas conferencias el autor, además de hacer una fuerte crítica a las teorías descripcioncitas, abordó temas de primer orden, como son el de los nombres, la referencia, la rigidez, la modalidad y la necesidad. A partir, de sus tres conferencias, y del artículo “Identidad y necesidad” publicado un (...) año después (1971), abordaremos aquí cuatro puntos, a saber: 1) La necesidad e identidad en las teorías de la referencia directa, 2) Designadores rígidos y mundos posibles, 3) Bautizo inicial, 4) el nombrar y la necesidad. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell dedicó parte de su obra a la discusión sobre el problema de la referencia y la descripción . Russell, junto Whitehead, elaboró un tratado de lógica matemática, titulado Principia Mathematica en el que retomó el proyecto de Frege tratando de demostrar que la matemática es una rama de la lógica. Russell no sólo tiene este propósito logicista, sino que también quiere concebir un lenguaje lógicamente perfecto , esto es, un lenguaje claro y preciso, en el que se elimina (...) toda ambigüedad y vaguedad. En una palabra el lenguaje de la ciencia. En este escrito desarrollaremos dicho propósito y veremos si tal lenguaje lógicamente perfecto es “aceptable” y conveniente en todos los contextos. (shrink)

There is a remarkable gap in the academic literature when it comes to group navigation, and procedural metacognition in group navigation is an important but virtually unexplored topic. The present paper aims to fill this gap by providing an account of how metacognitive feelings evaluate and regulate group navigational processes. The paper reviews animal studies and ethnographic work to elucidate three exiting processes in human group navigation: many-wrongs, leadership and emergent sensing. This is followed by an analysis of the role (...) of procedural metacognition in the navigational processes involved in each of these three processes. This analysis shows that procedural metacognition serves to regulate and evaluate group navigation in a flexible, process-specific way. When performance issues arise during group navigation, the emergence of negative affective states makes the navigational process conspicuous, prompting a modulation of said process. (shrink)

This paper investigates ontological dimensions of the blockchain by asking what kind of socio-technical object bitcoin is. It discusses both blockchain's political qualities and the political forms enabled by its emergence. It first observes recent approaches to the ontology of money and the political qualities of the ledgers used by the current fractional reserve banking model. It then directs the same questions at blockchain technology. The paper discusses an ontology proposed by Ole Bjerg and argues in favour of a mixed-ontology (...) approach to blockchains. It then questions the political qualities of the distributed ledger as a digital object and highlights the apparent absence of authority figures in the model. Finally, it argues that the political ontology of the blockchain can be framed as the displacement of authority from institutional actors into instrumental control of trust, in a dynamically distributed environment. (shrink)

The project of this paper is to understand what a phylogenetic tree represents and to discuss some of the implications that this has for the practice of systematics. At least the first part of this task, if not both parts, might appear trivial—or perhaps better suited for a single page in a textbook rather than a scholarly research paper. But this would be a mistake. While the task of interpreting phylogenetic trees is often treated in a trivial way, their interpretation (...) is tied to foundational conceptual questions at the heart of systematics—questions whose answers are hotly disputed. I have previously argued that widely shared ideas about the meaning and interpretation of phylogenetic trees are inconsistent with species concepts other than some genealogical version of a phylogenetic species concept (Velasco 2008). Here I rely on a similar approach and concentrate on the implications of the necessary conditions underlying the inferences that we make using phylogenetic trees. I argue that common practices for the interpretation and use of trees are in conflict and that unacceptable principles about species as units of phylogeny must be given up. According to the view that I will develop, all phylogenetic trees depict the history of populations. The branches on trees represent collections of population lineages through time and the splits represent population lineage splits. This is true regardless of whether the tips of the trees are themselves populations, or are species or higher taxa. Although this conclusion might be paired naturally with a view that species must be monophyletic groups, this population-centric view of trees is independent of that view of species. If we still want to have species that are paraphyletic groups of populations, this is permissible as long as we also do not treat species as the units of phylogeny. This population-centric view opposes a species-centric view of phylogeny and might be called a “rank-free” approach since it entails that we do not need to determine which groups are species (which is partly a ranking question) in order to build a tree. This conclusion and the argument for it are meant to be consistent with, but not require, acceptance of the conclusions of Velasco (2008) regarding species. (shrink)

Nota crítica a propósito de: LENDE, Daniel H. y GREG, Downey (editores), The Encultured Brain. An Introduction to Neuroanthropology , Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012.

Eurípides se distingue entre los autores de tragedia por la habilidad con que transforma los estereotipos mitológicos en seres con una identidad personal concreta. Son distintas las estrategias a las que recurre con este fin. Una de ellas consiste en presentarlos a través de otros mostrando a la vez su actuación y sus condicionantes psicológicos; otro recurso que utiliza es dejar entrever el???? de los personajes en los discursos que pronuncian, así como sus capacidades retóricas. Una tercera técnica es la (...) de crear enfrentamientos entre dos parejas de personajes de las que uno es un dios y otro un mortal. En todas estas técnicas, que maneja con gran pericia retórica, hay siempre una idea que subyace y que sirve de filtro y de fondo de discusión. En el caso de Alcestis, la piedra de toque del???? es el?????, la ley o costumbre y la interpretación que de ella hacen los protagonistas. (shrink)

Resumen En este artículo se examina el Darwinismo Neural en su explicación de la evolución de la conciencia humana, contrastando su metodología con la utilizada por Richard Lewontin, Richard Levins y Steven Rose, quienes han hecho importantes aportaciones en el estudio de los sistemas vivos desde un punto de vista dialéctico. Concluimos que la explicación interaccionista de la evolución de la conciencia planteada en el DN, supera muchas de las deficiencias del determinismo biológico; sin embargo, al compartir algunos lineamientos con (...) el cartesianismo, mantiene un carácter a-histórico insuficiente para la explicación de la conciencia humana. Finalmente, proponemos la adopción de una teoría explicativa de la conciencia humana que considere las relaciones existentes en ella, no sólo como interacciones sino también como interpenetraciones ontogénicas y filogenéticas.This article examines Neural Darwinism proposed as an explanation of evolution of human consciousness. His methodology is contrasted with that used by Richard Lewontin, Richard Levins, and Steven Rose, who made important contributions to the study of living systems from a dialectical point of view. We conclude that the interactionist explanation of the evolution of conscience put forward in ND overcomes many of the deficiencies proper to biological determinism. However, as ND also shares many of the foundations of the Cartesian approach, it maintains a non-historical character, insufficient for the account of human consciousness. We suggest the adoption of an alternative theory, able to fully explain human conscience which must consider the whole of existing relations in it, and, instead of merely considering them as interactions, they have to be observed as dialectical interpenetrations. (shrink)

Common ancestry is one of the pillars of Darwin’s theory of evolution. Today, the Tree of Life, which represents how all life is genealogically related, is often thought of as an essential component in the foundations of biological systematics and so therefore of evolutionary theory – and perhaps all of biology itself. It is an iconic representation in biology and even penetrates into popular culture.

El propósito de la “Dialéctica trascendental” es exponer cómo la razón es el origen de la ilusión trascendental, para prevenir los errores que puedan derivarse de ella. Sin embargo, en el “Apéndice”, Kant sostiene que la razón no sólo tiene este aspecto negativo o problemático, también es una facultad que le proporciona al entendimiento la meta de lograr una unidad sistemática de todo conocimiento. En el presente texto abordaré dos preocupaciones interpretativas en torno al “Apéndice”. La primera cuestiona si Kant (...) se contradice a sí mismo en esta sección al plantear que el principio de unidad sistemática es, simultáneamente, subjetivo y objetivo. La segunda reflexiona si se trata de una sección que contradice las tesis centrales de la “Analítica trascendental”, al presentar una nueva condición necesaria para el conocimiento, más allá de las establecidas por el entendimiento y la sensibilidad. (shrink)